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Abstract
Economic shocks have been shown to affect child labor and particularly so when
households fail to access credit. This paper endeavours to assess whether access to
agricultural labor markets also reduce the impact of shocks on child labor. Using panel
data from Tanzania, we confirm that households respond to transitory productivity
shocks by changes in child labor, but that (1) child labor increases with increases in
rainfall, (2) it increases less when households have access to a labor market and (3)
the agricultural labor market seems more efficient than the credit market to smooth
rainfall shocks. These findings are consistent with the theoretical model offered in
the paper. They highlight that imperfect agricultural labor markets are important
determinants of child labor.
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1
Introduction
In Africa, 58 millions children are engaged in some economic activity.1 Despite a
steady economic growth and a clear reduction in poverty, the share of working children
declines only slowly.2 This is in stark contrast with huge improvements obtained in
other dimensions of human capital, such as education and health, in the continent.3
After 15 years of intensive research on child labor, this phenomenon is now largely
perceived as negligible as long as children are enrolled in school. One reason explaining
this disinterest is that the bulk of child labor is invisible since it is performed on
the household farm. The available options to reduce such work are indeed limited.
However, in Tanzania, our country of study, 20% of working children4 declare that
their activity prevent them from learning correctly and 20% of them have already been
injured because of their activity.5 As a consequence, working is likely detrimental to
current well-being and future streams of income of the child.
There are conflicting views on the causes of child labor (see Edmonds (2008) for a
literature review). In this paper, we want to assess the role of shocks, and of credit
and labor market imperfections. More precisely, because rainfall shocks are exogenous
events, they are at the core of our paper. We are specifically interested in under-
standing how households react to such shocks and how this depends on the availability
of a credit and a labor market. Two crucial points need to be made upfront. First,
the effect of economic shocks on child labor has already been studied and there is
some evidence that when households can borrow, they tend to use less child labor to
smooth consumption (Beegle et al., 2006; Alvi and Dendir, 2011). The mechanism is
straightforward: a decrease in income raises incentives to work (for everybody in the
household, including children) but much less if the income reduction can be spread
over several time periods thanks to credit instruments. However, most of shocks faced
by households are not pure income shocks but rather also have a productivity compo-
nent, meaning that they also affect the household labor productivity. Figure 1 shows
that only 25% of shocks declared by Tanzanian households can be considered as pure
1Estimates based on the ILO report(Diallo et al., 2013).
2The poverty headcount ratio went down from 60% in 2000 to 45% in 2011. The estimated share of
African children aged 5-14 in employment moved from 28.8% in 2000, 26.4% in 2004, 28.4% in 2008 to
26.2% in 2012.
3One possible explanation for this could be that the MDg had not objective in terms of reduction of
child labor. As Edmonds and Shrestha (2014) put it, "we get what we pay for" and we should expect only
limited improvements by acting on child labor only through incentives to school enrollment.
45 to 15 years old.
5Author’s own calculations based on the child module of the 2006 Tanzania Labor Force Survey.
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income shocks, against at least 35% of shocks that have some productivity component.
For the economic analysis, this is crucial. For instance, a positive rainfall shock would
have two opposite effects. An income effect that leads to a decrease in child labor but
also a price effect that arises form the increase in labor productivity and leads to an
increase in child labor. The second point of importance is that the size of these two
effects depend highly on the availability of markets. If, for instance, a labor market can
provide non-household workers to a family that experiences an increase in productivity,
then this household does not need to increase its own labor supply to take opportunity
of the productivity increase. The size (and in the extreme, the existence) of the price
effect therefore depends on the availability of a labor market. As discussed before, the
size of the income effect depends on the availability of credit. We first demonstrate this
result in an agricultural household model in four different settings, depending on the
availability of each of the two markets. In this framework, we highlight the following,
maybe counter-intuitive result: in a situation where the price effect and the income
effect have opposite signs,6 the market that acts on the dominant effect is the one
that reduces child labor volatility in response to productivity shocks. If, as we show
later on, the price effect tends to dominate the income effect (due to poor access to
the labor market) then child labor is pro-cyclical and only improvements in the labor
market can lead to a reduction in child labor pro-cyclicity. In particular, access to
credit/savings would only reinforce pro-cyclicity, not diminish it, thereby leading to
more child labor.7 Our study is therefore a study of the respective role of the two
markets that exploit rainfall variation to identify these effects.
The second part of our paper consists in taking the model to the data. Indeed, the
total effect of rainfall deviations is theoretically unsigned and needs to be estimated.
Using the three rounds of the Tanzania LSMS-ISA panel datasets, matched with three
other datasets, we show that child labor does react pro-cyclically to rainfall deviations
and that this is less the case in places with an active labor market. More precisely, we
identify three categories of households: the vast majority is living in a very poor labor
market and for them the price effect dominates the income effect, a second category
of households with intermediate access to the labor market and for whom the price
effect compensates the income effect and a third and very thin category of households
6This is the case as soon as there is a price effect, meaning as soon as there are labor market imperfec-
tions.
7Parents who are able to transfer wealth to the next period have higher incentives to take full opportunity
of the productivity increase and therefore use more child labor.
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Figure 1: Share of shocks by nature in Tanzania
Source: LSMS-ISA, author’s computation.
• Productivity shocks = droughts, floods, crop loss, livestock loss, fall in sale prices
for crops, rise in prices of ag inputs, loss of land.
• Income shocks = job loss, rise in price of food, fire, dwelling damaged, robbery.
• Unclear = hh business failure, death or chronic disease of a hh member.
• Other = severe water shortage, death of other family member, breakup of hh,
hh member jailed.
with a good access to the labor market and for whom the income effect dominates
the price effect. The identification is achieved only through temporal variations due
to rainfall shocks and heterogenous responses by market activity. Throughout our
study, we control for villages fixed effects that could correlate with both average child
labor in the community and activity in the markets. By comparison, we observe little
heterogeneity of behavior by access to the credit market. Because this is at odds with
the (few) papers on this question, we provide a series of tests to understand why the
credit market does not help coping with shocks. We find that households seem to have
great difficulty using formal credit to smooth income even in places where banks are
available. When they do so, it allows them to cope with negative rainfall shocks and
avoid migration that would be harmful for the children. Apart from these extreme
situations, the credit market, be it formal or informal, does not help reducing child
labor. We also check empirically the validity of the assumptions in the model, such as
the rigidity of prices and wages.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature in child labor. The first is the
debate over the causes of child labor and notably the debate between the luxury axiom
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(Basu and Van, 1998), that postulates that child labor emanates from poverty, and the
wealth paradox (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003), that suggests that, because of markets
imperfections, only assets-endowed households can make their children work. Dumas
(2007), as well, finds that land-rich households use more child labor but Basu et al.
(2010) identify an inverted U-curve between child labor and landholdings.8 A parallel
strand of literature has tried to identify the effect of price variations on child labor.
Similar mechanisms are at play: an increase in the productivity leads to both an income
and a price effect. Here, the results are more mixed with some authors finding that the
income effect dominates (Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) using the rice price in Vietnam;
Cogneau and Jedwab (2008) using the cocoa price in Côte d’Ivoire) while others find
that the substitution effect dominates (Kruger (2007) using the coffee production in
Brazil; Alessie et al. (1992) using price indexes in Côte d’Ivoire). The literature has also
studied the effect of economic shocks and the heterogeneity in vulnerability, depending
on assets ownership and credit availability. Beegle et al. (2006) find that economic
shocks induce child labor but less so when households own assets. The dynamics of
assets ownership though might be endogenous to child labor use. Alvi and Dendir
(2011) provides evidence that more chld labor is used in case of a major flood but
that this is less the case when the household receives credit. However, credit take-
up might be correlated with (unobserved) household characteristics. Edmonds (2006)
also provides evidence that households fail to anticipate a future income stream, which
indicates that households may fail to access credit. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) show
that shocks are associated to decreases in education, but the effects are small. Closer
to what we do, because they use variations in rainfall, Shah and Steinberg (2013)
show that investment in human capital is procyclical in early life (before age 3) and
counter-cyclical later on.
The second strand of literature to which our paper relates is the analysis of the
household behavior with missing markets, as well as the analysis of the markets them-
selves. The most important result for us is the one of non-separability in case of missing
markets (Singh et al., 1986; de Janvry et al., 1991). Gavian and Fafchamps (1996), on
Niger, find that yields are strongly influenced by the manpower available to farming
households. Finally, two more papers deserve citation even though they inform us
little on Africa. They study how labor markets adjust in case of productivity shocks.
Jayachandran (2006) studies elasticity of wages to productivity shocks and finds that
8Dumas (2007) uses data from Burkina Faso, Dumas (2013) data from Madagascar, Bhalotra and Heady
(2003) data from Ghana and Pakistan and Basu et al. (2010) data from Northern India.
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wages do adjust. By contrast, Kaur (2014), on India as well, find wage rigidity in case
of rainfall shocks.
The article is organized as follows: section 1 discusses the sources of market im-
perfections in rural areas of the developing countries and derives the effect of shocks
depending on the existence and degree of perfection of the labor and credit markets re-
spectively. Section 2 describes the data, section 3 presents the estimation while section
4 provides the results.
1 Theory: rainfall impact on child labor depends on
market imperfections.
In this section, we show that rainfall variations affect child labor differently depending
on the availability of credit and labor markets. We will neglect the insurance and land
markets for the following reasons. First, African land markets are highly imperfect:
traditional land rights often prevent households from renting out or selling their land.
In our data, the share of land that is rented in is 4%. 95% of households rent in less than
37% of the land they use. 9 As a consequence, we will consider that the land market
is missing and that land is given for a household. Second, insurance markets are also
highly imperfect, with very little possibility to engage in a formal insurance scheme for
an agricultural household. Some rainfall-based insurances have been implemented in
various countries but with limited success: most households choose not to participate.
It would also be very difficult to separate the effect of credit markets from insurance
markets in consumption smoothing.
The theoretical section is organized as following: we start with a characterization
of the rainfall effect depending on the labor market imperfections and then proceed
to the credit market imperfections in case of missing labor markets. In each case, we
start by describing the polar cases of perfect market and of missing market, before
turning to the case of imperfect market. We eventually summarize the results in an
empirical specification taking into account both types of imperfections.
9In addition, studying land markets jointly with labor markets raises an identification question: perfect
land and labor markets could, in theory, be substitutes for each other. Indeed, if a household had excess
land, it could hire some worker to farm the land rather than sell it if the labor market is perfect, or sell
the land rather than hire if the land market was perfect.
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1.1 The labor market
1.1.1 Labor market imperfections
Sources of market imperfections Ray (1998) provides an excellent presenta-
tion of the various market imperfections in developing countries. Information assyme-
tries and lack of enforcement limit the possibilities of mutually advantageous exchanges
on the labor market. In particular, agricultural output variation due to weather shocks
or pests makes it difficult for the landlord to uncover his tenant’s effort and this results
in higher supervision costs. Such costs are similar to transaction costs on the labor
market and there might be a price-band (de Janvry et al., 1991), in which the landlord
prefers not to hire any labor force. An additional difficulty arises from the seasonality
of farm activities: all the farming households have the same tasks to undertake at the
same time. This synchronicity of needs prevents the households to exchange labor and
the large landowners face a labor supply shortage. Finally, the small number of actors
on the market makes it difficult to guarantee that the supply meets the demand.
1.1.2 Perfect labor market: separability of decisions
We are interested in analyzing the behaviour of farm households, who have to make
production and consumption decisions, as well as labor supply decisions. Agricultural
households have the specificity that they take simultaneous decisions regarding their
farm production and their consumption. However, it has been shown that if mar-
kets are perfect, their two decisions can be considered as “separable” from each other
(de Janvry et al., 1991).10 In order to display evidence on the role of labor market
imperfections, we start by describing such a situation. We model the household as
constituted of one adult and one child. We analyze the effect of rainfall on child labor
with a model where the parent value the child leisure. The child may provide some
on-farm labor but cannot provide off-farm work. The parent does not value his own
leisure; he therefore provides one unit of labor. In a context of perfect labor markets,
the parent may hire external workers or provide off-farm (wage) work. The household
10A simple way to analyze the decision process is to consider that households start with choosing pro-
duction levels and production inputs (including farm labor). This choice provides them with a given level
of farm profit; then they take their consumption decisions given this profit level. In particular, they can
freely chose the household leisure demand and labor supply since they can rely on the labor market to
satisfy their needs on the production side. If their labor demand is greater than their labor supply, they
hire; otherwise they provide some market work. This has strong consequences: no farm characteristics
should affect consumption decision (including labor supply), once profit is controlled for.
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maximizes its utility:11
maxU(C, lc) = φ(C)− lc (1)
s.t. C = AF (la + δlc) + w(1− la)
where C is household consumption, lc is child work hours, la is adult work hours on the
farm (household and non-household labor), w is the market wage, F is a production
function (which depends on the amount of land, which is kept implicit for the sake of
simplicity), δ is the labor marginal productivity ratio between adults and children, A
is a productivity factor. This productivity factor will reflect rainfall deviations from
the norm ion the area. The utility is assumed to be additively separable between
consumption and child leisure. We assume that φ′ > 0, φ′′ < 0, F ′ > 0 and F ′′ < 0.
The model deserves some attention on the productivity term. In the empirical
analysis, the productivity shock will be a rainfall shock. It is quite clear that most
of the rainfall variation is common to households from the same area. A variation
in rainfall could be associated with variations in crop prices and wages. However,
labor market rigidities will limit the macro-effect of rainfall. The lag between the
period where labor has to be supplied and the period in which prices vary will also
reduce the possible macro-effect of rainfall on food prices at the time of the decision.
We estimate changes in prices associated to rainfall deviations from the norm. The
prices that are used are for the most important crops in Tanzania as well as the most
exchanged commodities throughout the country. We show in Table 1 that prices are
quite inelastic. In particular, we only find that one positive standard deviation in
rainfall from the norm decreases the rice price by 4%. The other coefficients are non
significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. With regards to wages, they seem to
be elastic to negative deviations but not to positive deviations and more for wages
in agricultural activities. However, the coefficient, while large, is very imprecisely
estimated and is not significant anymore at the 10% level if we drop the village fixed
effects. As a consequence, we simplify the theoretical model by only taking into account
a household-level effect of rainfall on labor supply decisions.
11For the sake of simplicity, we neglect here the non-negativity constraint on lc, this will be taken into
account in the empirical part.
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The first-order conditions of the maximisation problem are:
δAF ′ =
1
φ′
(2)
AF ′ = w (3)
Child labor is chosen such that its marginal cost (in foregone utility) is equated to
its marginal benefit (increased utility from additional consumption), while household
adult work is chosen such that its marginal productivity in the 2 activities are equal.
No constraint prevails on the amount of labor that can be hired or sold on the market.
In apendix 5.1.1, we show that an increase A leads to a reduction in child labor, due
to a pure income effect:
∂lc
∂A
= − F
δAF ′
< 0 (4)
However, the assumptions here are stringent: external labor has to be a perfect
substitute for household labor. This is unlikely to be the case. We now depart from
this assumption by assessing the rainfall effect on child labor in the absence of an adult
labor market.
1.1.3 Case of no labor market
With a missing labor market, the household maximizes its utility under the constraint
of equating labor supply and labor demand:12
maxU(C, lc) = φ(C)− lc (5)
s.t. C = AF (1 + δlc)
The first-order condition is:
δAF ′ =
1
φ′
(6)
12More generally, we know that its production choices depend on its characteristics (laborforce and age
of the household members, for instance), while the consumption choices depend on the farm characteristics
(inputs), even conditional on the profit.
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We show in Appendix 5.1.2 that a change in A leads to the following variation in child
labor:
∂lc
∂A
= −
F + δF
′
φ′′/φ′2
δAF ′ + δ2A F ′′φ′′/φ′2
(7)
The denominator is positive but the sign of the numerator is unknown. The first
term of the numerator is similar to the income effect we observed in the previous case,
the second is the price effect. Even though terms in the different regimes cannot be
compared since the production and utility levels do not remain the same from one
regime to the other, it is important to note that the first-order effect of the absence
of the labor market is to add this price effect. Since the income effect and the price
effect are of opposite signs, it cannot be ascertained theoretically whether the effect of
rainfall shocks is larger with or without labor markets.
In this paper, we focus on rainfall variations (R) as a source of variations in income
and productivity. To sum up, in case of missing labor market, child labor is determined
by household income (I), child shadow wage (w∗)13 and other characteristics (Z):
lc = lc(I−, w
∗
+
, Z).
More rainfall is associated to a greater available income (I(R
+
)) but also to a greater
marginal productivity of labor (w∗(R
+
)).
1.1.4 Existing but imperfect labor market
Both cases are extreme, where adults can hire in/out as much as they want. A more
realistic case is obviously the situation in which the labor market exists but is imperfect.
This can be modeled either by adding transaction costs or by limiting the extent to
which households are able to use the market. This leads to several regimes (as in
Dumas (2013)) and is therefore quite difficult to identify empirically. We will take
a simpler route by acknowledging that, in the imperfect case, households may have
some limited ability to hire or sell laborforce. The better the market, the easier it is to
hire in/out and the lower the price effect.14 At the extreme of a perfect labor market,
13The sadow wage is defined by the child’s labor marginal productivity at the equilibrium.
14Another way to present it is simply to say that the village is made of households who are constrained
and households who are not constrained; the relationship that will be estimated is an average one and the
more households constrained there are, the stronger the price effect of rainfall. This leads to the same
conclusion.
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there is no price effect anymore. By comparison, we expect the change in the income
effect associated to an “improvement” in the market to be a second-order one: when
offered more opportunities, the households will change their behavior and therefore
may reach a higher level of income. Under the assumption that the 2nd-order effects
are negligible, the price effect decreases when the labor market is improved, while the
income effect remains broadly constant.
The relationship between child labor supply and rainfall variations results from an
income effect and a price effect and the size of the price effect depends on the degree
of perfection of the labor market.
lc = lc(I(R), w
∗(R) · (1− LM), Z)
where LM stands for labor market and takes continuous values from 0 (no labor
market) to 1 (perfect labor market).
If we linearize this relationship around R0, the average rainfall in the village, and
note ∆R = R−R0 the deviation from the average, we obtain:
lc = lc(I(R), w
∗(R) · (1− LM), Z)
= lc(I(R0), w
∗(R0) · (1− LMv), Z)
+lc1 · I ′(R0) ·∆R
+lc2 · w∗′(R0) · (1− LMv) ·∆R
≡ Kv + α0∆R+ β0∆R · (1− LMv)
= Kv + (α0−
+ β0
+
)∆R− β0
+
∆R · LMv
α0 is the income effect of rainfall on child labor, β0 is the price effect. (α0 + β0)
is the effect of rainfall variations on child labor with missing labor market. It can be
either positive or negative, depending on the relative size of the income (α0) and price
(β0) effect. β0 measures the difference in the rainfall effect when the labor market
works better.
If α0 + β0 is positive, then child labor is procyclical with rainfall when the labor
market is missing (positive covariance of child labor with rainfall). An improvement
in the labor market should be associated to a lower pro-cyclicity of child labor with
rainfall. When LM = 1 + α0β0 , rainfall deviations have no effect anymore on child labor
12
since the price effect offsets exactly the income effect. With further improvements
in the labor market above this level, child labor starts being counter-cyclical. If,
on the contrary, α0 + β0 is negative then child labor is counter-cyclical even with a
missing labor market and improvements of the labor market leads to a worsening of
the relationship between child labor and rainfall.
1.2 Adding a credit market
We now turn to the analysis of the credit market. Households are fully able to transfer
wealth over periods only if they have access to a credit market. In most cases, they
cannot because they are poor and lack the sufficient collateral. Because institutions are
weak, repayment cannot be enforced and this limited liability leads to credit rationing
(Ray, 1998; Bardhan and Udry, 1999). However, large interventions aiming to improve
households’ access to credit have been implemented, and it has probably improved over
the last decades.
With the previous model as a basis, we analyze the effect of rainfall variations on
child labor, depending on whether a credit market is available. First, our terminology
of “credit” market is loose here: actually, given that we are interested in negative and
positive rainfall variations, only the ability to transfer income over periods is relevant
and not specifically the ability to borrow. As a consequence, “credit” here encompasses
as well the ability to save. If households are able to save even when no credit market
is available, then only negative shocks will have different impact depending on the
availability of the credit market. We will look into that question in the empirical part.
1.2.1 Credit market (and no labor market)
In this section, we assume that the household lives for two periods and that, in the
second period, it does not receive any shock. The household therefore maximizes:
maxU1 + βU2 = φ(C1)− lc1 + βφ(C2)− βlc2 (8)
s.t. C1 = AF (1 + δlc1)− S (9)
C2 = F (1 + δlc2) +
1
β
S
where S denotes savings, the subscript 1 the first period, and the subscript 2 the
second period. Labor markets are missing in both periods.
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The first-order conditions are:
φ′1 = φ
′
2 (10)
AδF ′1 =
1
φ′1
(11)
δF ′2 =
1
φ′2
(12)
The first one implies that, as expected, consumption should be smoothed between
period 1 and period 2. We show in Appendix 5.1.3 that:
∂lc1
∂A
= −
1
1+β
(
F1 + β
AF ′21
F ′′2
)
+
δF ′1
φ′′/φ′2
δAF ′1 · 11+β
(
1 + AβF ′′2
)
+
δ2AF ′′1
φ′′/φ′2
(13)
This has to be compared to the expression obtained in the no credit-no labor case
(eq. 7). The main difference is on the income effect. Indeed, when offering the ability
to smooth income between periods, only a share of the additional income is consumed
and the income effect on child labor supply is lower. Conversely, if rainfall is lower
than usual, ability to borrow will allow the household to smooth over periods and
therefore to limit the income effect. If there was an insurance market or if the number
of periods is sufficiently long, then there would be no income effect anymore. However,
whether this translates into a reduction in child labor hours remains to be discussed
in the case of our model.
1.2.2 Existing but imperfect credit market
Again, if we focus on the first-order effects, then the relationship between child labor
and rainfall can be summarized in the following way:
lc = lc(I(R) · (1− CM), w∗(R), Z)
where CM stands for credit market and takes continuous values from 0 (no credit
market) to 1 (perfect credit market). After linearization around R0, we obtain:
lc = Kv + α1∆R+ β1(1− CMv)∆R+ β1∆R
= Kv + (α1−
+ β1
+
)∆R− α1−∆R · CMv
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where α1 is expected to be negative. In absence of a price effect (β1) and with a credit
market, child labor is smoothed between periods. However, with missing labor market,
α1 + β1 is unsigned. If α1 + β1 > 0 then an improvement of the credit market leads
to a greater pro-cyclicity of child labor with rainfall. If, on the contrary, α1 + β1 < 0
the credit market improvement leads first to a decrease in counter-cyclicity and then
to procyclicity.
2 Data
2.1 The Tanzania LSMS-ISA dataset
We use four independent sets of data and match them. The LSMS-ISA (Integrated
Survey on Agriculture) panel data are our main source of information. They were
collected in Tanzania in 2008-09, 2010-11 and 2012-13.15 Observations are clustered
in 410 enumeration areas. The survey is representative of the national population and
is made of 3,265 households in the first wave. The survey team managed a very low
attrition rate of 4.8% over the whole course of the panel. For the purpose of this study,
we are only interested in households who live in rural areas.
These data are particularly suitable for the study: very detailed information is
collected both on the household side and on the farm side. Farm labor hours are
collected for each household member. Farm labor is recorded over one year and this
is done by asking separately time spent on land preparation and planting, weeding
and harvesting. Our key variable will be the number of days of activity on the farm
provided by children.16
2.2 Other sources of information: Labor Force Survey, House-
hold Budget Survey and Rainfall record
The main difficulty with these data comes from the fact that only 8 households are
surveyed in each village. We are reluctant to use these 8 households to build our
credit and labor market measures, since this would lead to endogeneity biases. For
this reason, we use another dataset to assess market depth. We also do so because
15More precisely, from October 2008 to September 2009, then from October 2010 to December 2011 and
from October 2012 to November 2013. The data are available upon request on the website of the LSMS.
16Market work is also recorded for each individual older than 5, but hours of work were only recorded for
the previous week. Domestic work (and hours) is only recorded for the previous day. We do not use these
variables in our main analysis but they allow us to check that the assumptions of our model are valid, in
particular the absence of child labor market.
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our working hypothesis is that market functioning varies little from one period to the
next and there is little to loose in using a constant measure of market activity.17 We
match our LSMS observations with the Tanzania Labor Force Survey (LFS) collected
in 2005. In the LFS, we will proxy availability of a labor market by the activity on the
market. Indeed, the higher the transaction costs, the fewer the households who want to
engage in transactions. Two questions are particularly relevant: whether the household
has at least one member providing wage work, and whether the household hires wage
workers. We aggregate this information at the ward level.18 If a LSMS village can
be matched with its ward in the LFS, we do so. Otherwise, we match the LSMS
village with its district surveyed in the LFS and use the average use of the market in
the district. For each village surveyed in the LSMS, two variables are available: the
share of households with at least one member providing wage work, and the share of
households hiring workers. We normalize these two variables so that they range from
0 to 119, both for the ease of comparison and for the ease of interpretation. The first
measure is then called the "Labor market (Wage)" and the second the "Labor market
(employed)". When they are equal to 0, there are no transactions on the labor market,
the market is missing. It is difficult to assert above which threshold the market can be
considered as “perfect". Given that we have scaled the labor market measures so as to
range from 0 to 1, we will state that the market is perfect when the measure equals
1. Finally, were villages closed-economies, these two measures would reflect the exact
same information. In practice, their correlation only amounts to 0.30. However, given
our interpretation, we expect quite similar results with these two variables. Finally,
we have to mention that this procedure restricts the area under study to mainland
Tanzania, since the LFS was not covering Zanzibar. As a result, we cover 227 rural
localities surveyed in the LSMS.
We apply a similar methodology to build our credit measure. Again, we rely
on a external source of information, namely the Household Budget Survey (HBS),
collected in 2006. This survey includes the following information with regards to credit:
availability of a bank within 5 kilometers from the household, whether household
members own a bank account, whether household members have taken a loan in the
previous 12 months, and whether household members participate in an informal savings
17Another way to put it is to say that it would be very difficult to achieve identification of the effect of
markets through time variability in these markets, especially for the labor market.
18A ward comprises several villages. We have on average 50 observations per ward.
19More precisely, we set the 5th percentile at 0 and the 95th percentile at 1, so as to avoid issues with
outliers in the upper-tail of the distribution.
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group. Rather than using each variable independently, we build a credit market index
at the ward level through a principal components analysis (the results are displayed
in Appendix, Table 7.) The information is then matched with the LSMS-ISA data at
the ward level if the same two wards have been surveyed, and at the district level if
not. For reasons that will become clear later on, we also use as a robustness check the
information provided in the LSMS-ISA regarding the availability of a bank in 2008 in
the surveyed areas. This information was collected in the village questionnaires and is
not built based on household use of the bank. Figures 2 show how the labor market
and credit market measures are distributed over Tanzania. We see for these figures
that there is no systematic relationship between the credit and the labor market, which
will allow us to identify the effect of both variables.
(a) Share of households in the district who hire
workers, LFS information (b) Credit index, HBS information
Figure 2: Labour and credit markets
Finally, the data were matched with rainfall data20, thanks to the availability of
the GPS information.21 Tanzania has two types of agriculture: in the North-North
East, there is only one cropping season, that lasts roughly from November to May; the
rest of the country has two cropping seasons, the short one taking place in October-
February (called vuli) and the long one in February-July (masika)). In the LSMS-ISA
data, households were retrospectively interviewed about working time, inputs and
production during the masika and vuli seasons separately. They are all answering
20 http://iridl.ldeo.columbia.edu/SOURCES/.NOAA/.NCEP/.CPC/.FEWS/.Africa/.DAILY/.ARC2/
.daily/.est_prcp/datafiles.html
21The data provided by the LSMS include rainfall data, both for the survey year and for the average
over the last decade. However, since they do not provide the standard deviation in rainfall, we cannot
standardize the rainfall deviations, hence the need to re-match the data.
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for the same masika season, but the day of interview (partly) determines which vuli
season they should answer for. However, there are clearly some inconsistencies with
regards to the schedule and the periods the households are supposed to answer for. In
addition, it is doubtful that households are able to provide accurate information for
periods that are more than one year in the past. For the sake of simplicity, we use
rainfall from January to December of the year of the LSMS wave. In practice, it means
that for the third wave of the panel, collected between October 2012 and December
2013, we use rain fallen in 2012. This is the variable we call "Rainfall year t". "Rainfall
year t-1" is the rain fallen in 2011 for observations collected in 2012-13. We provide
robustness checks with regards to alternative specifications for the rainfall variable
in the Appendix. Finally, we are interested in the effect of rainfall shocks: we thus
compute the deviation from the mean in the area, divided by the standard deviation in
the area. Mean and standard deviations are computed using years 2001-2013. Rainfall
estimates are given by squares of roughly 10km x 10km, the Tanzanian territory is
covered with 104 such small squares and 222 of them are used in our final sample. We
do not discretize this information since, according to our model, any deviation, even
small, could lead to an adjustment of child labor. We show in Appendix that the use
of discrete shocks does not alter the results.
2.3 Child labor in the data
Conforming to the ILO definition of child labor, we focus on children aged 5 to 15.22
We have various sources of information in the data about child labor: whether the
child has worked in the week before the survey (and how many hours), which is likely
impacted by the date of the survey, hours of domestic work in the day before the
survey and finally hours of agricultural work in the farm over the previous year. We
will mostly focus on this last variable for two reasons: first, its collection for the whole
year makes it more relevant when it comes to understanding how child labor reacts to
economic shocks; second, observed shocks being rainfall variation, agricultural labor
is also the one the most likely to be affected. However, it is also necessary to check
whether agricultural child labor is a large share of child labor, at least in rural areas.
Among the 5 to 15 years old children who live in a rural area, 76% have not worked
in the last 7 days, against 24% who had an economic activity. Only 2% of children
22“Child labor” is made of all working children under 12 and of children between 12 and 14 years of
age who work more than 14 hours per week. In our case, we do not separate these two categories since
ultimately what we explain in the number of work hours, not the status work/no work.
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of this age range have provided some wage work. By comparison, 17% of 20-55 years
old have provided wage work in the last week. This testifies of an absent child labor
market, while adults are able, at least to some extent, to sell their labor force.
Two-thirds of children have not performed any domestic work during the day before
the interview. Among those who have provided domestic work, the median duration
is half an hour. As expected, girls are more likely to perform domestic chores (41% of
them participate against 25% for boys) but when they do so, they do not spend more
hours than boys.
Among children aged 5 to 15 and who belong to a household owning some land23,
26% have participated to the farming. When they do so, they work on average 38 days
per year and 50% of the working children work more than 23 days per year. However,
there is a wide discrepancy by child age, as can be shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Days of agricultural work (on the farm), by child age
Child age Avg # of work days Share of working children Avg # of work days among workers
5 0.30 1.3% 22.28
6 0.75 2.7% 27.35
7 1.39 5.3% 25.92
8 2.21 8.4% 26.10
9 5.25 19.9% 26.34
10 6.63 23.9% 27.73
11 11.66 31.1% 37.48
12 14.10 41.7% 33.76
13 20.72 50.6% 40.95
14 25.31 58.4% 43.31
15 29.86 63.2% 47.24
Finally, only 10% of the 5 to 15 years old children are not enrolled in school.
2.4 Markets in the data
We use the Labor Force Survey to describe the labor market. For villages surveyed
in the LSMS, the share of households who provides wage work is on average 18% and
ranges from 0 to 69%. The share of households who hire in is as low as 5% on average
but ranges from 0 to 48%. At this stage, we cannot rule out that (some) households
choose to remain in autarky and that this stylized fact of a very low use of the labor
market is the result of a choice rather than of a constraint. Indeed, small transaction
23Given that we restricted the sample to the rural areas of Tanzania, 93% of households do own some
land.
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costs can explain the low market activity if the household labor demand is close to
their supply. However, if we do find that rainfall has price effects on child labor, it is
symptomatic of labor market imperfections.
We use the information displayed in the Household Budget Survey to describe the
credit market. For villages that are matched to the LSMS-ISA data, we find that 37%
of them are less than 5kms away from a bank, that on average 14% of households
have a bank account but only 3% have a credit from the bank. This last variable
ranges from 0 to 26%. Finally, 8.5% of households participate in an informal savings
group and this ranges across villages from 0 to 41%. The formal credit market seems
therefore very much limited but households may manage to borrow from their peers.
3 Estimation
The theoretical section derives the empirical model. If we take into account the fact
that observed child labor is non negative, the model is the following one:
l∗cvt = γ0∆Rvt + γ1∆Rvt · LMv + γ2∆Rvt · CMv +Xcvtβ + ξv + ηt + cvt (14)
lcvt =
 l∗cvt if l∗cvt ≥ 00 otherwise
where c denotes a child, living in village v at date t. The included covariates (Xcvt)
are child’s age and gender. We voluntarily restrict the number of covariates in order to
reduce as much as possible the risk of endogenous variables, probably at the expense
of a more precise estimation. We include year and village fixed effects. The latter
controls for any fixed village characteristics. We therefore expect that level-effects of
market imperfections are taken into account through these fixed effects. Obviously,
varying and unobserved determinants are likely to affect child labor but unlikely to
be correlated with rainfall deviations nor with any variable that would be interacted
with rainfall deviations. In addition to that, our labor and credit market imperfections
measures are made of observations collected in 2006/2007, before the observation of
child labor in our data, and most likely in different villages. With such a specification,
the risk of endogeneity is very limited. To be completely clear, let us emphasize that
the source of identification of the effect of rainfall arises from the variation in child labor
over time and the identification of the effect of market imperfections arises from the
heterogeneity in elasticity of child labor to rainfall variation over space. Heterogeneity
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within areas plays no role in the identification24 and we do not use time variation in
markets to identify their effect.
An issue could come from the inclusion of village fixed effects in a nonlinear model.
This “incidental parameter” problem leads, in theory, to a biased estimation. However,
Greene (2004) shows, based on Monte Carlo simulations, that the bias is quite limited
in a Tobit model when the number of observations by fixed effect is higher than 8. In
our case, we have on average 45 observations by village (coming from three different
waves and different households in each wave). However, we have a higher censoring
than in Greene’s simulations (75% instead of 40%). In Appendix, Table 10 provide
the same regressions estimated by OLS and show that the results are similar.
Finally, because we match information from the LFS and the HBS data at the ward
or district level, we cluster standard errors at the district level.
4 Results
4.1 Effect of the labor market
We first assess the effect of rainfall on child labor. Table 3, first column, shows that
more rainfall in the year is associated to higher levels of child labor but the coefficient is
very imprecisely estimated. We need to allow for heterogenous effect by labor market
imperfection to obtain a significant effect of rainfall. In columns (2) and (3) of Table
3, we find that with missing labor market, an increase in rainfall leads to an increase
in child labor. This suggests that, in such a situation, the price effect dominates
the income effect. By comparison, households who have access to a labor market
do not increase child labor as much. When the wage employment measure is equal
to 1, the effect of rainfall turns out to be negative: only the income effect remains.
This is consistent with the theoretical model. We obtain the same results with the
two labor market measures. From a welfare perspective, an intermediate degree of
imperfection is interesting since it allows to counterbalance income and substitution
effects and therefore to smooth productivity shocks. The absence of effect of shocks
on child labor is of particular interest if there is a risk of hysteresis: if children who
have started working are more likely to work again.
The theoretical model suggests that positive rainfall deviations increase child labor,
24The same model could be estimated using areas x year as units of observations, but we would loose in
precision because of our inability to control for the covariates.
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the more so when adults cannot rely on a labor market to hire external workforce. Neg-
ative rainfall deviations should decrease child labor except if parents are able to work
off-farm. We therefore want to check whether most of the effect is driven by positive
or negative rainfall deviations. We therefore create two variables: “Positive rainfall”,
which is equal to rainfall if rainfall is positive and 0 otherwise, as well as “Negative
rainfall", equal to rainfall when it is negative and 0 otherwise. As a consequence, the
coefficient signs for these two variables are expected to be the same as when regressing
on the rainfall variable.25 However, the coefficient size could be different, especially if
households or markets are asymmetric (for instance, if households adjust child labor
supply upwards but not downwards; or if markets allow adults to work off-farm but
cannot hire-in). Table 3 shows that most of the action lies in positive rainfall devia-
tions. Negative rainfall deviations do not affect child labor. This means that parents
do not wish to reduce child labor when they have the opportunity to do so (lower
on-farm demand) or that adults are free to provide off-farm work. By comparison,
increases in rainfall lead to higher levels of child labor, that are mitigated if the labor
market is better functioning. To be very clear, the labor market imperfections we are
qualifying really bear on the ability to hire in; this is not about adult unemployment.
Values given in Table 3 are the marginal effects on the latent variable (l∗). Table
4 provides the marginal effect of an increase in rainfall by one standard deviation on
actual days of child work (lc) for an average child, for different values of the wage
employment measure. We find that an increase in rainfall by one standard deviation
increases child labor by 4.63 days for children living in a place with no labor market
(panel A). This quite seemingly low value is actually an increase by a half of child
work days.26 30.4% of the child population lives in a place with no labor market.
By comparison, children living in a place with a wage employment measure equal to
0.3 (for instance) do not work more when rainfall deviates from its mean. The share
of households with at least a member providing some wage work in those places is
actually quite low (between 14 and 20%). This suggests that even small improvements
in the prevalence of wage work could allow to smooth productivity shocks faced by
households. The population can be divided into 3 groups. In the first (where the wage
employment measure ranges from 0 to 0.29), children have to increase their labor sup-
ply when rainfall deviates from its mean. This first group accounts for 73% of the
25The negative rainfall variable takes non-positive values and an increase in negative rainfall is a lower
departure from the average.
26In the sample, average work days is 9.9.
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population. In the second (where the wage employment measure ranges from 0.30 to
0.69), children are immune from rainfall shocks. This second group accounts for 24%
of the population. The third and last group is defined by a wage employment measure
above 0.70 and comprises children whose labor supply vary with rainfall but the asso-
ciation is counter-cyclical (because of an income effect that dominates the substitution
effect). This last group accounts for a small 3% of the population. There is therefore
almost three quarters of the child population who would benefit from an improvement
in the labor market and even small increases in the number of transactions on the labor
market could achieve the goal of eliminating child labor due to productivity shocks.
In addition, most of children belonging to the second group would not suffer from an
increase in the labor market activity. The picture drawn by the employed workers
measure is very similar to the first measure.
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Table 4: Labor market: Marginal effect of rainfall (year t) on actual days of child work
Panel A: Wage employment measure
Share of hhs Level of Rainfall Positive rainfall Negative rainfall
wage employment (col 2) (col 4) (col 4)
0 30.4% 3% 1.58** 4.63*** -0.95
0.1 24.9% 9% 1.08 3.46*** -0.91
0.2 17.4% 14% 0.58 2.33** -0.86
0.3 9.3% 20% 0.07 1.22 -0.82
0.4 4.9% 25% -0.44 0.15 -0.78
0.5 5.7% 31% -0.97 -0.88 -0.74
0.6 4.2% 38% -1.50* -1.89 -0.70
0.7 0.8% 42% -2.05** -2.87 -0.66
0.8 0.5% 48% -2.60** -3.83* -0.62
0.9 1.4% 54% -3.16** -4.77* -0.58
Panel B: Employed workers measure
Share of hhs Level of Rainfall Positive rainfall Negative rainfall
employed workers (col 3) (col 5) (col 5)
0 33.0% 0% 1.10 3.93** -1.07
0.1 19.3% 3% 0.83 3.13** -0.98
0.2 11.9% 4% 0.56 2.36** -0.89
0.3 16.1% 6% 0.28 1.59 -0.80
0.4 3.7% 8% 0.01 0.85 -0.71
0.5 4.9% 10% -0.26 0.11 -0.62
0.6 1.1% 11% -0.54 -0.59 -0.53
0.7 1.2% 13% -0.82 -1.30 -0.45
0.8 1.7% 15% -1.11 -1.99 -0.36
0.9 6.7% 16% -1.40 -2.67 -0.27
Note: Marginal effect of an increase in rainfall by one standard deviation on the number of actual days
of child work for an average child. Estimation based on Table 3, columns specified in parentheses. The
distribution given is the share of observations between the value of the measure and the next. For
instance: 30.4% of children live in a place where the wage employment measure is comprised between 0
and 0.1. Such a measure corresponds broadly to a situation where 3% of households in a village/district
provide wage work. Years of the panel included: 2008-09, 2010-11, 2012-13. ***, ** and * respectively
mean that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
4.2 Effect of the credit market
We now turn to the credit market. Columns 2 and 5 of Table 5 show that the credit
market, as measured in the HBS survey, does not make much difference on the effect
of shocks. Effects are quite imprecisely estimated. Given that this is at odds with the
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literature and the model, we also use a contemporaneous measure of the availability
of credit. Indeed, if credit markets change over time, it could be that the measure
obtained from HBS is only loosely related to the credit market at the time of the
survey. However, we also fail to see any effect of the alternative measure (columns
(3) and (6) of Table 5). This result suggests that households who live in areas with a
credit market are not better able to smooth child labor in case of shocks.
Despite a seemingly surprising result, this is very consistent with information ob-
tained from households. In wave 2012, the LSMS survey asks what households have
done in order to compensate for shocks. Among households who suffered from shocks:
54% did not do anything, 20% declared to have relied on own savings, 11% received
unconditional help from relatives, 2.8% changed eating patterns, 1% had an adult
household member started working, 1% sold livestock, and... 0.8% obtained credit.27
Table 6 provides a somewhat different picture, in particular when one looks at the
effect of the availability of a bank in 2008. The significant, positive and non negligible
effect of positive rainfall on child labor points suggests that improvement on the credit
market can lead to an increase in the pro-cyclical child labor by reducing the income
effect. To put it differently, if households are able to save income for the next period,
they have greater incentives to put their children to work in case of good harvests
than if they had to consume all the income within the period. This is predicted by
the theoretical model. This is the only coefficient significant at the 5% level. However,
the sign of the effect in the last column is not consistent with the theoretical model,
but again this might be explained by the fact that banks actually only allow to save
not to borrow. We try to provide additional evidence on this in the next section.
We acknowledge immediately the possibility that credit and labor markets are
correlated and run regressions with rainfall interacted with both the labor and the
credit market. In addition, we also provide linear estimations that are not prone to
the incidental parameter bias. Table 10, left panel, shows the results hold when the
analysis is run simultaneously for the credit and the labor markets and when we run
a linear estimation. This being done, it remains to understand why the credit market
has no effect on the extent of the rainfall shock. One possibility is that the effect of
the credit market is only the income effect and that income effect might be small if
parents have weak preferences regarding child labor. We already have some elements
of information. Going back to Table 4, we could infer that −4.77 is the income effect
27Use of child labor to mitigate shocks was not an offered modality.
26
(no price effect of rainfall when the labor market is perfect), while the price effect is
equal to 4.63 − (−4.77) = 9.33. The size of the income effect seems to be half the
size of the price effect. However, before concluding to that, need to assess whether
a) households manage to smooth income, b) the formal credit market helps them in
doing so, c) the credit market is used to buy inputs, which affect labor productivity
and d) if selective attrition explains our results. The next section provides evidence
on all these questions.
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Table 6: Credit market: Marginal effect of rainfall (year t) on actual days of child work
Credit measure in 2006 HBS
Share of hhs Rainfall Positive rainfall Negative rainfall
(col 3) (col 5) (col 5)
0 42.9% 0.95 2.55* -0.38
0.1 13.3% 0.74 2.28* -0.55
0.2 12.2% 0.52 2.00* -0.71
0.3 9.9% 0.31 1.73 -0.88
0.4 6.0% 0.10 1.45 -1.05
0.5 3.9% -0.10 1.18 -1.22
0.6 5.6% -0.32 0.91 -1.39
0.7 1.1% -0.54 0.65 -1.57
0.8 1.6% -0.75 0.38 -1.75
0.9 3.2% -0.97 0.12 -1.92
Bank available in 2008 LSMS
Share of hhs Rainfall Positive rainfall Negative rainfall
(col 2) (col 4) (col 4)
0 77.8% 0.45 1.07 -0.12
1 22.2% 0.24 4.08** -2.77*
Note: Marginal effect of an increase in rainfall by one standard deviation on the number of ac-
tual days of child work for an average child. Estimation based on Table 5, columns specified in
parentheses. The distribution given is the share of observations between the value of the measure
and the next. For instance: 42.9% of children live in a place where the credit market measure is
comprised between 0 and 0.1. ***, ** and * respectively mean that the coefficient is significantly
different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
4.3 Looking for an effect of the credit market
In this section, we try to understand the absence of effect of the credit market. From
here on, for the sake of simplicity, we only provide the results with the wage employ-
ment measure (for the labor market).
First, we run the same regressions using rainfall in year t−1. Our purpose is twofold.
First, if households can transfer wealth from one period to the other, then rainfall in
year t − 1 can still have some effect on labor in year t. The expected effects are the
following: an increase in rainfall in year t−1 should lead to a reduction in child labor in
year t insofar as child leisure is a normal good. As a consequence, we are interested on
whether rainfall in year t−1 has some effect, and which kind of variations (positive vs.
negative) affect child labor in year t. If is only positive variations, then it means that
households are able to save and therefore postpone their reduction of labor. If both
29
positive and negative variations affect child labor then households are able to save and
borrow. However, not observing a change in child labor is not a definitive test of the
existence of the market since households may have very weak preferences with regards
to non-child labor. In addition, there could be some hysteresis effect: children who did
work in year t− 1 are more likely to work in year t, whatever the weather conditions.
Table 8 shows very little effect of rainfall in year t− 1 on child labor in year t, despite
the fact that the coefficient is positive as expected. The size of the elasticity to rainfall
is of similar magnitude (and not significant) whether we consider positive or negative
deviations from the norm. We also do not see any heterogenous effect by the existence
of a labor market, which conforms to the intuition. Table 9 displays some marginally
significant effects but that are not robust through specifications. In addition, as we
will see later on, there is no significant effect of rainfall in year t − 1 on adult farm
work, while it should be the case if households had the ability to transfer wealth across
periods (and value leisure). This whole set of results point to an extremely limited
coverage of the credit market. However, it does not explain why we fail to detect any
heterogeneity by availability of a bank.
Second, another reason why the effect of the credit market might fail to be signifi-
cant is if it changes faster than the labor market. In that case, our 2006 HBS variable
and, to a smaller extent, our 2008 LSMS variable might suffer from a measurement-
error bias. We therefore check that the absence of effect holds when using the 2010
information on the availability of a bank, the similar 2012 information and a time-
varying variable.28 The last option is relevant if the credit market evolves quickly.
However, insofar as it is not constant over time, it could correlate with other changes
in the villages. The results are provided in Table 11. It shows that we do not gain any
significance by using other credit variables. The evolution of the credit market does
not explain its lack of effect.
Third, we directly assess whether households manage to take up loans in hardships.
We therefore estimate the probability of having received some credit in the last 12
months. We use three variables in order to do so: a) any type of credit is considered,
and in particular, from any source b) only formal loans are considered and c) only loans
obtained from the network are considered.29 Table 12 shows first that the results are
28We cannot implement a similar check by using informal credit since the only information available
on this is collected at the household level. Given the small amount of surveyed households, it would be
difficult to find a measure based on this information that would not be plagued by endogeneity issues.
29Are considered as formal loans taken from: commercial banks, micro-finance institutions, mortgage
societies, insurance companies, other financial institutions. Network loans are those obtained from neigh-
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consistent whatever the credit market variable. Second, it shows that households do
adjust to rainfall variations with credit but that most of the action lies in the informal
market: quite surprisingly, households borrow less from relatives and friends when
the rainfall deviates from the norm.30 However, because the action is in the informal
sector, we fail to find any significant effect by availability of a bank. This is surprising
since, among our credit market measures, the one built on 2006 HBS encompasses
informal exchanges and uses actual credit, not just availability of the bank.
Fourth, in order to further check our (absence of) results on the credit market, we
assess whether deviations in rainfall led to changes in other inputs than child labor,
which would have affected labor productivity and hence the use of child labor. Table
16 shows that current rainfall increases adult work on the farm but not the use of
pesticides nor fertilizers. More importantly, we do not see any heterogenous effect
depending on the availability of the market. The absence of effect of the credit market
can therefore not be attributed to changes in other inputs.
Fifth, if households are only able to obtain informal insurance from their peers, then
there should be some adjustment in case of major negative shocks that the informal
insurance cannot help to cope. We look at selective migration. In our dataset, there are
two types of attrition: first, households are re-surveyed but have moved in another area;
second, they are not resurveyed - in that case, they are also more likely to have moved.
Table 13 shows that, depending on waves, between 5 and 9% of children move out of
the area and/or are not resurveyed. We start by looking at whether this is related to
rainfall shocks. Table 14 shows that this is the case. In particular, a negative rainfall
deviation by one standard deviation (∆R = −1) decreases the likelihood of being
resurveyed in the same area by 5%pt. However, there is heterogeneity by availability
of the credit market: households who have access to banks manage to stay in the
area. We might want to know what happens to these children who have to leave as
a consequence of the negative rainfall shock. Given that they escape our dataset, we
can use instead the new individuals in the households.31 However, questions about
migration are only asked to individuals older than 12. Table 13 shows that the number
of additional children (aged 12 to 15) roughly matches the number of losses. A rapid
bours, friends, religious institutions and self-help groups. For the sake of clarity, other loans, such as those
obtained from a money lender or from the employer are left out of these last 2 categories but are counted
in the variable "has a loan".
30Recall that the negative rainfall variable takes negative values. Results change when one uses only
discrete shocks rather than continuous deviations. This should therefore not be interpreted as the effect of
a shock.
31Obviously, in order to do this, we use the whole sample, including urban areas.
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check confirms that these children are worse-off than the others, in terms of labour
supply. However, what is of interest to us is whether they are worse-off than their rural
counterparts. We therefore build up a sample made of our sample children plus the
additional children who have migrated. For consistency purposes, we restrict ourselves
to children aged 12 to 15 years old. Table 15 shows that children who have migrated
are more likely to declare as main occupation: employed (+6%pt), unpaid family
worker (+6%pt) and paid family worker (+2.6%pt). They are also vastly less likely
to be enrolled in school (-24%pt). Unsurprisingly, they are not more likely to be farm
worker. We also look at work hours. On average, they provided 7.5 more hours of
paid work in the last week, but do not seem to be providing more unpaid hours. They
also provide on average 15 days less of farm labor. Based on these comparisons, it is
difficult to be definite on whether they are worse-off than their rural counterparts since
their increase in paid work is compensated by a decrease in farm work. However, they
are clearly children more at risk of falling into more dangerous types of activities. In
addition, these children only account for 4.5% of the total sample and including them
in the estimation32 could not change vastly the results.
To summarize our findings on the credit market: households seem to have great
difficulty using formal credit to smooth income even in places where banks are available.
When they do so, it allows them to cope with negative rainfall shocks and avoid
migration that would be harmful for the children. Apart from these extreme situations,
the credit market, be it formal or informal, does not help reducing child labor (because
in our setting, the price effect overcomes the income effect).
Finally, even if child labor is the main topic of this paper, we might also be in-
terested in knowing whether households manage to smooth consumption in case of
shocks. We cannot look at the effects on consumption because there is a wide lag
between the harvest period and the time at which the consumption is measured. In-
deed, we see from the data that the consumption measured in the survey does not
depend on rainfall. However, we can check if assets have been depleted or increased.
We consider two categories of assets: durables that are valued as consumption goods
and productive assets. Based on a long list of questions on assets ownership, we build
two indices based on a principal component analysis. Table 16 shows no evidence of
assets adjustments with rainfall deviations, and no heterogenous effect by existence of
markets. However, it is noticeable that almost all coefficients are larger in the first
32We cannot do so because our estimation relies on village fixed effects and we do not know where these
children have migrated from.
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part of the Table (Rainfall in year t) than in the second (Rainfall in year t − 1). It
may be the case that there are changes but they are too imprecisely estimated to be
detected.
4.4 Robustness checks
We also provide complementary results in order to check the validity of our estimation.
First, our theoretical (and empirical) model rules out any general equilibrium effect
at the village level. We already showed that wages and prices are rigid and do not vary
much with rainfall deviations. However, for our setting to be valid, we need the prices
and wages to be rigid whether there is a labor (credit) market or not. In case the market
for goods is better integrated in places where the labor market has less imperfections,
then we could see that prices adapt to shocks in these areas, at the expense of the
validity of our strategy. Table 17 shows that there is no heterogenous effect by labor
market nor credit market of rainfall on main crop prices and (agricultural) wages.As a
consequence, wages seem quite rigid, which of course is one mechanism driving labor
market imperfections.
Second, we check whether our results are sensitive to the choice of rainfall period.
We do this with two different tests. The first one consists in using only information
regarding the long rainy season, since all households are interviewed on the same long
rainy season (while, depending on the survey date, they are interviewed on different
short rainy seasons). Recall, however, that the long rainy season does not cover the
same months depending on the place of residence. Defining the rainfall period therefore
is not straightforward. Table 18 provides the results when using only rainfall and child
work during the last rainy season. The results are less clear than previously but go in
the same direction. In addition to that check, we also run the same regressions using
alternative 12-months rainfall periods (for instance, from February 1st year t − 1 to
January 30th, year t.) The whole set of results is available upon request to the author.
Regressions with cut-offs around January are the ones which display larger and more
precise coefficients on rainfall. We interpret this as the fact that this is the relevant
period of rainfall. For comparison, we display in column (2) of Table 18 the results for
period from June, 1st to May, 31st of the following year.
Third, we also check whether the results hold when one uses discrete rainfall shock
variables. We define as positive shocks events where rainfall is greater than usual
by more than one standard deviation, and negative shocks as events where rainfall
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is lower than usual by more than one standard deviation.33 Results are provided in
Table 19. We use both a Tobit estimation and a linear regression because the variability
in RHS variables has been greatly reduced. The results are mostly similar to what
was found before. However, column (2) finds that when the credit market is better,
households exploit the opportunity by making children work more in case of positive
shocks. The effect is not symmetrical for negative shocks and does not hold with the
Tobit specification though. Results are not perfectly aligned in columns (3) and (4)
depending on the specification.34
Finally, we also wish to provide evidence that imperfect labor markets are associ-
ated to more child labor (independently from rainfall). In order to do this, we have to
abandon village fixed effects.35 As already stated, labor markets functioning is likely
correlated with (un)observed characteristics of the area, that may also affect child labor
decisions. The results provided in Table 20 can therefore not be interpreted as causal
effects of labor and credit market imperfections. However, they are clearly indicative of
a strong relationship between child labor and market imperfections. The association
is stronger with labor market imperfections than with credit market imperfections,
which is in line with the results obtained in this paper.
Conclusion
For understanding child labor, the role of the labor market deserves as much attention
as the credit market. Indeed, we find that positive rainfall shocks increase child labor
supply when there is no labor market but this effect can be entirely smoothed when
the labor market has a better functioning. Interestingly, a very efficient labor market
fails to smooth rainfall variations since there is no price effect to counterbalance the
income effect. However, only a small share of the population live in places with highly
intense labor markets.
By comparison, the formal credit does not manage to smooth child labor over
periods. This is in line with the theoretical model with missing labor market and
in our data, this could be driven by weak preferences regarding child labor. This
33This amounts to discretizing our normalized rainfall at -1 and +1.
34Interpretation of column (3) could lead to two mechanisms: either a positive rainfall shock has long-
lasting effects on the productivity (this would explain both significant coefficients) or households manage
to save from one period to the next (but this would only explain the coefficient on the interaction term).
Given that only the interaction term is (marginally) significant in column (4), it is difficult to choose the
mechanism at stake.
35We allow for regional fixed effects.
34
suggests that much more economic policy could be devoted to improving labor markets
and further research should be undertaken to understand the heterogeneity in labor
market imperfections.
35
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs
5.1.1 Perfect labor market, no credit market
The first-order conditions (2) and (3) imply 1φ′ = δw. In this model, an increase in A
does not lead to a change in C (all the increase in income is used for reduction in child
labor, because of the constant marginal disutility associated to child labor). Hence:
∂C
∂A
= F +A
(
F ′
∂la
∂A
+ δ
∂lc
∂A
)
− w∂la
∂A
since AF ′ = w, we obtain:
∂C
∂A
= 0 = F +AF ′δ
∂lc
∂A
and
∂lc
∂A
= − F
δAF ′
< 0
We can also easily show that ∂la∂A > 0.
5.1.2 Missing labor market, no credit market
We use:
∂C
∂A
= F + δAF ′
∂lc
∂A
and when deriving the first-order condition with respect to A, we obtain:
δF ′ +Aδ2F ′′
∂lc
∂A
= − φ
′′
φ′2
∂C
∂A
= − φ
′′
φ′2
(
F + δAF ′
∂lc
∂A
)
Hence:
δA
(
δF ′′ +
φ′′
φ′2
F ′
)
∂lc
∂A
= −
(
φ′′
φ′2
F + δF ′
)
∂lc
∂A
= −
F + δF
′
φ′′/φ′2
δAF ′ + δ2A F ′′φ′′/φ′2
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5.1.3 Missing labor market, perfect credit market
The first-order condition (10) implies that C1 = C2. As a consequence,
(1 + β)
∂C1
∂A
=
∂(C1 + βC2)
∂A
= F1 + δAF
′
1
∂lc1
∂A
+ δβF ′2
∂lc2
∂A
= F1 +
1
φ′
(
∂lc1
∂A
+ β
∂lc2
∂A
)
Deriving AF ′1 = F ′2 with respect to A leads to:
F ′1 +AδF
′′
1
∂lc
∂A
= δF ′′2
∂lc2
∂A
∂lc2
∂A
=
1
δF ′′2
(
F ′1 +Aδ
∂lc1
∂A
)
and substituting in the previous equation:
(1 + β)
∂C1
∂A
= F1 +
1
φ′
[
β
δF ′′2
F ′1 +
(
1 +
Aβ
F ′′2
)
∂lc1
∂A
]
When deriving the second first-order condition with respect to A:
δF ′1 +Aδ
2F ′′1
∂lc1
∂A
= − φ
′′
φ′2
∂C1
∂A
and substituting in the previous equation leads to:
δF ′1 +Aδ
2F ′′1
∂lc1
∂A
= − φ
′′
φ′2
1
1 + β
[
F1 +AδF
′
1
(
β
δF ′′2
F ′1 +
(
1 +
Aβ
F ′′2
)
∂lc1
∂A
)]
Hence:
∂lc1
∂A
= −
1
1+β
(
F1 + β
AF ′21
F ′′2
)
+
δF ′1
φ′′/φ′2
δAF ′1 · 11+β
(
1 + AβF ′′2
)
+
δ2AF ′′1
φ′′/φ′2
5.1.4 Perfect labor and credit markets
The programme writes:
maxU1 + βU2 = φ(C1)− lc1 + βφ(C2)− βlc2 (15)
s.t.C1 = AF (l
1
a + δlc1) + w(1− l1a)− S
C2 = F (l
2
a + δlc2) + w(1− l2a) +
1
β
S
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with S savings. The first-order conditions are:
φ′1 = φ
′
2 (16)
AF ′1 = w (17)
F ′2 = w (18)
AδF ′1 =
1
φ′1
(19)
δF ′2 =
1
φ′2
(20)
Eq. (16) implies that C1 = C2. Eq. (18) and (20) imply 1φ′ = δw hence no change in
comsumption in case of variation in A. Hence: ∂C1∂A =
∂C2
∂A = 0. Since
∂C1
∂A
= F +AF ′1
∂l1a
∂A
+AδF ′1
∂lc1
∂A
− w∂l
1
a
∂A
= F +AδF ′1
∂lc1
∂A
= 0
thus
∂lc1
∂A
= − F
AδF ′1
< 0.
5.2 Additional tables
Table 7: Principal component analysis in Household Budget Survey to build the credit
index
Credit measure in 2006 HBS
Variable Credit index
Bank within 5 km distance 0.33
At least one household member has a bank account 0.46
Number of household members with a bank account 0.46
At least one household member has had a loan from a bank over the last 12 months 0.44
Number of household members with a credit from a bank over the last 12 months 0.44
At least one household member participate in an informal savings group 0.24
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Table 12: Credit take up: loans in the past 12 months (year t) on rainfall year t, by
availability of credit institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank in - 2006 (HBS) 2008 2010 2012 year t
Variable is - constant constant constant constant time-varying
Panel A: Dependent variable: Has a loan
Positive rainfall -0.0286* -0.0112 -0.0344* -0.0258 -0.0213 -0.0243
(0.0158) (0.0207) (0.0177) (0.0187) (0.0193) (0.0198)
Negative rainfall 0.0349** 0.0356* 0.0263 0.0329* 0.0313* 0.0277*
(0.0140) (0.0183) (0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0165)
Positive rainfall x Bank -0.0532 0.0180 -0.0247 -0.0346 -0.0216
(0.0642) (0.0342) (0.0360) (0.0379) (0.0387)
Negative rainfall x Bank -0.00386 0.0303 0.0154 0.0123 0.0302
(0.0587) (0.0278) (0.0310) (0.0277) (0.0259)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,022 4,022 4,007 3,772 3,988 3,922
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Panel B: Dependent variable: Has a formal loan
Positive rainfall 0.0190* 0.0158 0.0170 0.0206* 0.0263** 0.0224*
(0.00978) (0.0146) (0.0113) (0.0121) (0.0110) (0.0116)
Negative rainfall 0.00713 0.0182** 0.00324 0.00634 0.00293 0.00454
(0.00644) (0.00823) (0.00714) (0.00713) (0.00667) (0.00673)
Positive rainfall x Bank 0.0134 0.00716 -0.0144 -0.0345 -0.0149
(0.0359) (0.0244) (0.0217) (0.0222) (0.0178)
Negative rainfall x Bank -0.0426 0.0138 0.00241 0.0158 0.00363
(0.0312) (0.0156) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0131)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,022 4,022 4,007 3,772 3,988 3,922
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
Panel C: Dependent variable: Has a network loan
Positive rainfall -0.0539*** -0.0413** -0.0589*** -0.0541*** -0.0535*** -0.0522***
(0.0148) (0.0188) (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0163)
Negative rainfall 0.0242** 0.0177 0.0229* 0.0265** 0.0267** 0.0211*
(0.0106) (0.0139) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0124)
Positive rainfall x Bank -0.0410 0.0155 -0.0110 -0.00229 -0.0116
(0.0556) (0.0312) (0.0416) (0.0452) (0.0407)
Negative rainfall x Bank 0.0243 0.00389 -0.00744 -0.0118 0.0142
(0.0451) (0.0239) (0.0276) (0.0259) (0.0213)
Village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,022 4,022 4,007 3,772 3,988 3,922
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Note: Estimations performed by linear regression. Years of the panel included: 2008-09, 2010-11, 2012-
13. ***, ** and * respectively mean that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
Table 13: Attrition in the sample
2008-2010
Sample in 2008: 2844
Attrited Entering
Age range 5-15 12-15 12-15
Not surveyed or not in same area: 164 61 Recent migration: 60
5.77% 6.46%
2010-2012
Sample in 2010: 3344
Attrited Entering
5-15 12-15 12-15
Not surveyed or not in same area: 292 91 Recent migration: 84
8.73% 8.24%
46
Table 14: Likelihood of being in the sample in the following wave
(1) (2)
Rainfall normalized 0.0173
(0.0132)
Rainfall x Labor market (wage) -0.0125
(0.0417)
Rainfall x Credit market (2006 PCA) -0.0543
(0.0334)
Positive rainfall -0.0552*
(0.0322)
Negative rainfall 0.0469**
(0.0198)
Positive rainfall x Labor market (wage) -0.00288
(0.0880)
Negative rainfall x Labor market (wage) -0.00460
(0.0668)
Positive rainfall x Credit market (2006 PCA) 0.0147
(0.0762)
Negative rainfall x Credit market (2006 PCA) -0.0921*
(0.0473)
Village fixed effects yes yes
Observations 6,188 6,188
R-squared 0.001 0.002
Note: Estimation performed by linear regressions. Dependent variable
is: whether the child is resurveyed and living in the same area in the
following wave. Years of the panel included: 2008-09, 2010-11 (and 2012-
13 for the outcome). Additional control variables are: age and gender of
the child, year. ***, ** and * respectively mean that the coefficient is
significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
47
T
ab
le
15
:
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
of
ch
ild
re
n
w
ho
ha
ve
m
ig
ra
te
d
an
d
th
e
ot
he
rs
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
M
ai
n
oc
cu
pa
ti
on
H
ou
rs
D
ay
s
A
g.
w
or
ke
r
E
m
pl
oy
ed
U
np
ai
d
fa
m
ily
P
ai
d
fa
m
ily
Sc
ho
ol
P
ai
d
w
or
k
U
np
ai
d
w
or
k
A
g.
w
or
k
D
om
.
w
or
k
A
g.
w
or
k
(w
ee
k)
(w
ee
k)
(w
ee
k)
(d
ay
)
(s
ea
so
n)
M
ig
ra
te
d
0.
03
13
0.
05
94
**
*
0.
05
81
**
0.
02
65
**
*
-0
.2
41
**
*
7.
53
4*
**
1.
35
5
-0
.5
23
-0
.0
96
3
-1
4.
82
**
*
(0
.0
35
4)
(0
.0
06
77
)
(0
.0
23
8)
(0
.0
08
59
)
(0
.0
43
1)
(0
.8
76
)
(0
.9
26
)
(1
.3
26
)
(0
.1
51
)
(3
.9
59
)
M
al
e
0.
01
29
0.
00
43
7*
*
0.
00
85
4
-0
.0
02
98
-0
.0
27
4*
0.
14
7
-1
.1
50
**
*
1.
92
9*
**
-0
.2
35
**
*
0.
12
6
(0
.0
11
5)
(0
.0
02
21
)
(0
.0
07
76
)
(0
.0
02
80
)
(0
.0
14
0)
(0
.2
85
)
(0
.3
02
)
(0
.4
32
)
(0
.0
49
2)
(1
.2
90
)
A
ge
-0
.2
10
-0
.0
27
5
-0
.3
49
**
*
-0
.0
09
95
0.
59
7*
**
-0
.5
73
-0
.9
91
-4
.7
56
-0
.4
45
23
.6
0
(0
.1
53
)
(0
.0
29
3)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.0
37
2)
(0
.1
87
)
(3
.7
93
)
(4
.0
11
)
(5
.7
43
)
(0
.6
54
)
(1
7.
15
)
A
ge
sq
ua
re
d
0.
01
00
0*
0.
00
11
1
0.
01
33
**
*
0.
00
04
54
-0
.0
25
1*
**
0.
04
34
0.
05
83
0.
21
9
0.
01
67
-0
.6
86
(0
.0
05
68
)
(0
.0
01
09
)
(0
.0
03
82
)
(0
.0
01
38
)
(0
.0
06
92
)
(0
.1
41
)
(0
.1
49
)
(0
.2
13
)
(0
.0
24
3)
(0
.6
36
)
R
ur
al
0.
15
0*
**
0.
05
18
**
*
-0
.0
37
2
-0
.1
39
**
*
-0
.0
89
4
-6
.0
55
**
*
0.
65
0
3.
58
4*
*
0.
19
4
0.
76
2
(0
.0
46
6)
(0
.0
08
92
)
(0
.0
31
3)
(0
.0
11
3)
(0
.0
56
7)
(1
.1
53
)
(1
.2
19
)
(1
.7
46
)
(0
.1
99
)
(5
.2
13
)
A
w
ay
fr
om
m
ot
he
r
-0
.0
09
21
0.
00
69
0*
*
0.
01
38
0.
01
36
**
*
-0
.0
20
3
0.
80
0*
-2
.8
75
**
*
-1
.4
36
**
-0
.0
77
5
-3
.6
29
*
(0
.0
17
2)
(0
.0
03
30
)
(0
.0
11
6)
(0
.0
04
19
)
(0
.0
21
0)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
51
)
(0
.6
46
)
(0
.0
73
6)
(1
.9
29
)
A
w
ay
fr
om
fa
th
er
0.
01
93
-0
.0
01
09
0.
01
55
0.
01
14
**
*
-0
.0
41
9*
*
1.
28
6*
**
-2
.8
00
**
*
-0
.2
89
-0
.0
41
4
2.
76
5
(0
.0
16
1)
(0
.0
03
08
)
(0
.0
10
8)
(0
.0
03
90
)
(0
.0
19
6)
(0
.3
98
)
(0
.4
21
)
(0
.6
02
)
(0
.0
68
6)
(1
.7
99
)
D
is
tr
ic
t
F
E
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
3,
55
8
3,
55
8
3,
55
8
3,
55
8
3,
55
8
3,
55
8
3,
55
8
3,
55
8
3,
55
8
3,
55
8
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
04
3
0.
02
8
0.
01
7
0.
13
2
0.
07
0
0.
11
2
0.
04
9
0.
02
2
0.
00
9
0.
03
1
N
ot
e:
E
st
im
at
io
n
pe
rf
or
m
ed
by
lin
ea
r
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
is
m
ad
e
of
ch
ild
re
n
ag
ed
12
-1
5
an
d
w
ho
ar
e
in
th
e
m
ai
n
sa
m
pl
e
pl
us
th
e
ch
ild
re
n
ag
ed
12
-1
5
w
ho
ha
ve
re
ce
nt
ly
m
ig
ra
te
d
(l
es
s
th
an
2
ye
ar
s
si
nc
e
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t
in
th
e
ne
w
re
si
de
nc
e)
.
Y
ea
rs
of
th
e
pa
ne
l
in
cl
ud
ed
:
20
08
-0
9,
20
10
-1
1,
20
12
-1
3.
T
he
di
st
ri
ct
s
us
ed
fo
r
th
e
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
ar
e
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
of
re
si
de
nc
e
fo
r
no
n-
m
ig
ra
ti
ng
ch
ild
re
n
an
d
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
of
or
ig
in
fo
r
m
ig
ra
ti
ng
ch
ild
re
n.
**
*,
**
an
d
*
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
m
ea
n
th
at
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
t
is
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
di
ffe
re
nt
fr
om
0
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l.
48
T
ab
le
16
:
O
th
er
ou
tc
om
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
(y
ea
r
t)
on
ra
in
fa
ll
ye
ar
t
an
d
t-
1
P
an
el
A
:R
ai
nf
al
li
n
ye
ar
t
A
du
lt
da
ys
Fe
rt
ili
ze
rs
P
es
ti
ci
de
D
ur
ab
le
P
ro
du
ct
iv
e
on
th
e
fa
rm
(v
al
ue
)
(v
al
ue
)
go
od
s
as
se
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
R
ai
nf
al
ln
or
m
al
iz
ed
13
.2
5*
*
3,
82
3
-1
,4
07
0.
05
52
0.
01
54
(5
.2
50
)
(3
,6
53
)
(1
,7
06
)
(0
.0
39
1)
(0
.0
24
1)
R
ai
nf
al
lx
La
bo
r
m
ar
ke
t
(w
ag
e)
-8
.9
00
-7
,5
43
42
4.
2
-0
.1
45
-0
.0
84
1
(1
5.
49
)
(9
,2
08
)
(2
,0
46
)
(0
.1
78
)
(0
.0
76
1)
R
ai
nf
al
lx
C
re
di
t
m
ar
ke
t
(2
00
6
P
C
A
)
-1
4.
30
-2
,7
31
-8
00
.9
0.
07
88
-0
.0
50
8
(1
0.
28
)
(6
,5
04
)
(2
,2
87
)
(0
.0
99
3)
(0
.0
74
3)
V
ill
ag
e
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
4,
02
2
3,
96
9
3,
96
9
4,
02
2
4,
02
2
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
1
0.
15
7
0.
12
1
P
an
el
B
:R
ai
nf
al
li
n
ye
ar
t
−
1
A
du
lt
da
ys
Fe
rt
ili
ze
rs
P
es
ti
ci
de
D
ur
ab
le
P
ro
du
ct
iv
e
on
th
e
fa
rm
(v
al
ue
)
(v
al
ue
)
go
od
s
as
se
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
R
ai
nf
al
ln
or
m
al
iz
ed
-1
.4
01
-1
,9
83
-3
41
.0
0.
03
32
-0
.0
03
64
(5
.3
94
)
(2
,7
85
)
(1
,2
15
)
(0
.0
34
8)
(0
.0
18
6)
R
ai
nf
al
lx
La
bo
r
m
ar
ke
t
(w
ag
e)
24
.5
2
-9
,0
12
3,
56
0
0.
04
39
0.
07
04
(1
7.
01
)
(1
0,
38
6)
(2
,4
53
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.0
71
0)
R
ai
nf
al
lx
C
re
di
t
m
ar
ke
t
(2
00
6
P
C
A
)
-1
6.
41
12
,9
96
-9
91
.4
0.
02
35
-0
.0
32
1
(1
3.
43
)
(1
2,
32
2)
(3
,7
13
)
(0
.0
90
3)
(0
.0
35
8)
V
ill
ag
e
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
4,
02
2
3,
96
9
3,
96
9
4,
02
2
4,
02
2
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
00
2
0.
00
5
0.
00
1
0.
15
8
0.
12
0
N
ot
e:
A
du
lt
w
or
k
on
th
e
fa
rm
ar
e
ad
ul
t
ho
us
eh
ol
d
da
ys
of
w
or
k
+
hi
re
d
ad
ul
ts
da
ys
of
w
or
k.
D
ur
ab
le
go
od
s
an
d
pr
od
uc
ti
ve
as
se
ts
ar
e
in
di
ce
s
bu
ilt
th
ro
ug
h
pr
in
ci
pa
lc
om
po
ne
nt
an
al
ys
is
us
in
g
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ea
ch
it
em
s
ow
ne
d
by
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
Y
ea
rs
of
th
e
pa
ne
l
in
cl
ud
ed
:
20
08
-0
9,
20
10
-1
1,
20
12
-1
3.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
le
ve
l.
A
dd
it
io
na
l
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e:
co
lu
m
ns
(1
)
to
(3
):
ye
ar
;
co
lu
m
ns
(4
)
an
d
(5
):
ho
us
eh
ol
d
co
m
po
si
ti
on
va
ri
ab
le
s
an
d
ye
ar
.
**
*,
**
an
d
*
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
m
ea
n
th
at
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
t
is
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
di
ffe
re
nt
fr
om
0
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l.
49
T
ab
le
17
:
P
ri
ce
s
an
d
w
ag
es
(y
ea
r
t)
on
ra
in
fa
ll
ye
ar
t
R
ai
nf
al
li
n
ye
ar
t
R
ic
e
M
ai
ze
C
as
av
a
Su
ga
r
B
ea
ns
K
er
os
en
e
W
ag
e
A
g.
w
ag
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
R
ai
nf
al
ln
or
m
al
iz
ed
-6
.8
24
-1
99
.9
10
5.
9
-2
79
.7
-3
5.
44
6,
16
5
-8
,0
20
-5
9,
35
6
(2
5.
36
)
(2
90
.8
)
(8
7.
22
)
(3
41
.4
)
(4
0.
33
)
(6
,5
90
)
(1
6,
85
1)
(3
9,
58
6)
R
ai
nf
al
lx
La
bo
r
m
ar
ke
t
(w
ag
e)
-3
9.
64
13
3.
3
17
1.
8
4,
75
5
-6
1.
93
14
,9
38
-3
3,
63
0
41
,1
34
(6
5.
07
)
(2
84
.2
)
(2
05
.1
)
(4
,5
35
)
(1
05
.6
)
(1
4,
37
1)
(4
4,
15
7)
(7
5,
28
1)
R
ai
nf
al
lx
C
re
di
t
m
ar
ke
t
(2
00
6
P
C
A
)
-3
2.
52
-3
2.
40
-4
86
.2
**
-2
,2
92
20
8.
3
-2
9,
92
8
-1
,4
62
7,
29
7
(5
8.
09
)
(2
43
.4
)
(1
95
.1
)
(2
,1
69
)
(1
93
.8
)
(2
1,
70
4)
(3
3,
42
6)
(3
8,
60
2)
V
ill
ag
e
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
94
2
73
7
32
0
94
6
91
2
87
2
2,
00
3
58
3
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
68
3
0.
19
6
0.
22
6
0.
03
1
0.
00
5
0.
06
4
0.
02
1
0.
10
0
N
ot
e:
Y
ea
rs
of
th
e
pa
ne
l
in
cl
ud
ed
:
20
08
-0
9,
20
10
-1
1,
20
12
-1
3.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
le
ve
l.
A
dd
it
io
na
l
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e:
ye
ar
an
d
un
it
of
m
ea
su
re
.
**
*,
**
an
d
*
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
m
ea
n
th
at
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
t
is
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
di
ffe
re
nt
fr
om
0
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l.
50
T
ab
le
18
:
C
hi
ld
la
bo
r
(y
ea
r
t)
on
va
ri
ou
s
ra
in
fa
ll
ye
ar
t
R
ai
nf
al
l:
Lo
ng
R
ai
ny
Se
as
on
R
ai
nf
al
lf
ro
m
Ju
ne
to
M
ay
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
R
ai
nf
al
ln
or
m
al
iz
ed
1.
75
7
0.
93
3
-1
.9
46
0.
69
8
(1
.1
60
)
(1
.6
75
)
(1
.6
89
)
(2
.4
69
)
R
ai
nf
al
lx
La
bo
r
m
ar
ke
t
(w
ag
e)
0.
84
4
-6
.0
94
(6
.5
02
)
(9
.8
71
)
R
ai
nf
al
lx
C
re
di
t
m
ar
ke
t
(2
00
6
P
C
A
)
2.
73
9
-6
.4
67
(4
.0
12
)
(9
.4
80
)
P
os
it
iv
e
ra
in
fa
ll
4.
04
7
7.
64
7*
(2
.5
69
)
(4
.3
24
)
N
eg
at
iv
e
ra
in
fa
ll
-2
.2
68
-1
1.
15
*
(2
.0
64
)
(6
.5
33
)
P
os
it
iv
e
ra
in
fa
ll
x
La
bo
r
m
ar
ke
t
(w
ag
e)
-1
1.
57
-3
2.
52
*
(1
2.
18
)
(1
8.
54
)
N
eg
at
iv
e
ra
in
fa
ll
x
La
bo
r
m
ar
ke
t
(w
ag
e)
14
.9
4
37
.9
3*
(9
.5
65
)
(2
1.
51
)
P
os
it
iv
e
ra
in
fa
ll
x
C
re
di
t
m
ar
ke
t
(2
00
6
P
C
A
)
4.
55
5
6.
53
9
(8
.8
52
)
(1
9.
88
)
N
eg
at
iv
e
ra
in
fa
ll
x
C
re
di
t
m
ar
ke
t
(2
00
6
P
C
A
)
1.
25
8
-2
2.
22
(4
.6
70
)
(1
6.
61
)
V
ill
ag
e
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
10
,1
02
10
,1
02
10
,1
02
10
,1
02
10
,1
02
10
,1
02
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
15
8
0.
15
8
0.
15
8
0.
09
19
0.
09
20
0.
09
24
N
ot
e:
E
st
im
at
io
n
pe
rf
or
m
ed
by
m
ax
im
um
lik
el
ih
oo
d.
Y
ea
rs
of
th
e
pa
ne
l
in
cl
ud
ed
:
20
08
-0
9,
20
10
-1
1,
20
12
-1
3.
A
dd
it
io
na
l
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e:
ag
e
an
d
ge
nd
er
of
th
e
ch
ild
,
ye
ar
.
**
*,
**
an
d
*
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
m
ea
n
th
at
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
t
is
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
di
ffe
re
nt
fr
om
0
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l.
51
Table 19: Child labor (year t) on rainfall shocks year t and t-1
year t year t− 1
Tobit Linear Tobit Linear
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive shock 29.63*** 6.300* 10.18** 1.023
(6.666) (3.582) (5.020) (1.705)
Negative shock 5.395 -1.159 -1.504 -1.441
(4.722) (2.174) (10.57) (2.760)
Positive shock x Labor market (wage) -87.91*** -25.32*** -64.72*** -13.09*
(14.38) (7.382) (19.75) (7.240)
Negative shock x Labor market (wage) -24.35* -0.743 -32.82 1.666
(13.50) (6.858) (28.66) (4.682)
Positive shock x Credit market (2006 PCA) 11.20 17.16** 16.45 6.461
(15.81) (6.811) (12.29) (5.486)
Negative shock x Credit market (2006 PCA) 4.760 -0.491 10.01 -6.064
(10.00) (4.417) (20.74) (5.746)
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102 10,102
R-squared 0.133 0.131
Pseudo-R2 0.0703 0.0706
Note: Estimation performed by maximum likelihood in columns (1) and (3) and by linear regressions in
columns (2) and (4). Years of the panel included: 2008-09, 2010-11, 2012-13. Additional control variables
are: age and gender of the child, year. ***, ** and * respectively mean that the coefficient is significantly
different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table 20: Child labor (year t) on rainfall year t: direct "effect" of markets
Rainfall year t
(1) (2) (3)
Rainfall normalized 4.894* 3.543 5.422*
(2.940) (2.662) (2.919)
Labor market (wage) -27.13*** -23.58**
(8.654) (9.359)
Credit market (2006 PCA) -14.42*** -4.870
(5.448) (5.596)
Rainfall x Labor market (wage) -16.57*** -13.04
(6.280) (8.591)
Rainfall x Credit market (2006 PCA) -10.98 -5.236
(8.034) (8.772)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 10,102 10,102 10,102
Pseudo-R2 0.0765 0.0762 0.0766
Note: Estimation performed by maximum likelihhod. Years of the panel included: 2008-09,
2010-11, 2012-13. Additional control variables are: age and gender of the child, year. ***,
** and * respectively mean that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1%,
5% and 10% level.
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